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THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY:
A VALID APPLICATION OF § 10(B) TO
PROTECT PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
INFORMATION
United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. O'Hagan,1 the United States Supreme
Court held that the misappropriation theory is a valid basis
upon which to'impose § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability for secu-
rities fraud.2 The Court found that the misappropriation theory
satisfies the statutory requirement of § 10(b) that a deceptive
device be used "in connection with" a securities transaction.!
The Court reasoned that the misappropriation theory, by pro-
scribing trading based on misappropriated confidential infor-
mation, promotes market integrity and investor confidence.4
This, in turn, advances the underlying purposes of § 10(b) and
Rule 101>5. 5
In addition, the Supreme Court held that Rule 14e-3(a),
which prohibits trading while in possession of material nonpub-
lic information regarding a tender offer, is a valid exercise of
the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) rulemaking
authority under § 14(e) . The majority did not rule on the
authority of the SEC to define fraud . Rather, the Court found
Rule 14e-3 (a), "as applied to cases of this genre," to be a means
reasonably designed to prevent fraud in tender offers under §
14(e).8
This Note agrees with the Court's assessment that the mis-
appropriation theory is a valid basis upon which to impose §






7 Id. at 2217.
aId.
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10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability.9 First, this Note asserts that the
misappropriation theory is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent10 interpreting the statutory language of § 10(b)."
Second, this Note argues that the misappropriation theory pro-
tects property rights in information and promotes investor con-
fidence in the securities market, thereby increasing market
efficiency and integrity. 2 Finally, this Note advances a solution
to the "in connection with" dissent 3 of Justice Thomas. 4 This
Note argues that the correct approach is to consider the gather-




It is axiomatic that the operations of and the information
used by the securities market is an area in "special need of regu-
lation for the protection of investors." 6 Without such regula-
tion, investors may worry that they are being deprived of the fair
market value of their investments if others illegally use confi-
dential information. 7 As a result, those same investors might
choose alternatives to the stock market, thereby making it more
difficult for corporate issuers to raise capital. 8 This, in turn,
would adversely affect this nation's economic growth and stabil-
ity' 9 As part of the inquiry regarding this potentially disastrous
situation, courts have dealt with the following issue: When must
' See infra Part V. This Note does not express any opinion regarding the Court's
holding on § 14(e) or Rule 14e-3(a).
10 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980).
" See infra Part VA
,2 See infta Part V.B.
SO'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220-25 (ThomasJ, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
,
4 See infra Part V.C.
15 See infra id.
6In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961).
17 Barbara J. Finigan, To Catch a Thief: The Misappropriation Theoy and Securities
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a person who knows material nonpublic information 0 disclose
such information before trading on it?2' The answer to that
question has changed significantly over the years.22 Conse-
quently, to gain an adequate understanding of the issue, this
Note examines three distinct time periods: (1) the years prior to
the passage of § 10(b)23 and Rule 10b-524 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934;25 (2) the years after the passage of § 10(b)
Technically, there are two types of material nonpublic information: corporate in-
formation and market information. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 656 n.15 (1983);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 241 n.1 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The former refers to information generated within the corporation, such as expected
earnings of the corporation, while the latter entails information generated from out-
side the corporation, for example, advance news of an impending tender offer. John
F. Olson et al., Part I: Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 223, 228 (1985); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and In-
formational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 329-33
(1979). In practice and in this Note, however, the generic term "inside" information
is used interchangeably with the phrase "material, nonpublic" information. See Dirks,
463 U.S. at 648, 655 (initially describing information received by defendant as mate-
rial nonpublic, then subsequently as inside information).
2' See Diana L. Hegarty, Rule 10b-5 and the Evolution of Common-Law Fraud-The Need
for an Effective Statutory Proscription of Insider Trading by Outsiders, 22 SUFFouxU. L REv.
813, 820-21 (1988). A violation of the securities laws based on the failure to disclose
material nonpublic information is known as a "material omission." Id. The issue of
when a material misrepresentation is unlawful is beyond the scope of this Note.
See infra Part ll.B to Part ll.E.
" Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1996) (emphasis added).
4 In 1942, Rule lob-5 was adopted pursuant to the Commission's § 10(b) rulemak-
ing authority and states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996) (emphasis added).
215 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1996).
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and Rule 10b-5 but before Chiarella v. United States26 and Dirks v.
SEC;27 and (3) the years since the Chiarella and Dirks decisions.
B. BEFORE § 10(B) AND RULE 1OB-5: THE COMMON LAW ERA
Under the common law, a failure to disclose material in-
formation is fraudulent only when there is a duty to speak .2
This duty to speak is created "when one party has information
that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them." 9
In most jurisdictions, an insider30 of a corporation has no
duty to disclose material information before trading.3' For ex-
ample, in Goodwin v. Agassiz3 2 the court ruled that the defen-
dants,3 3 both insiders of Cliff Mining Company (Cliff), did not
defraud Goodwin, a shareholder of Cliff, when they bought his
shares on the Boston Stock Exchange without disclosing their
possession of material inside information. The court held that
insiders of a corporation have a fiduciary duty only to the cor-
poration itself, not to individual shareholders.-s Since there is
no trust relationship between the insiders and the individual
shareholders, insiders are neither under a duty to speak nor are
they guilty of fraud if they trade securities based on material
36
nonpublic information, From a policy perspective, the court
found it significant that the securities were traded on an imper-
sonal stock exchange. According to the majority, the plaintiff's
theory of liability puts:
[a] n honest director... in a difficult situation... [since] he could nei-
ther buy nor sell on the stock exchange shares of stock in his corpora-
2 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
21 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
29 i.
3' An insider refers to a director, officer, or controlling shareholder of a corpora-
tion. InreCady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
3' Hegarty, supra note 21, at 817. Because there were no federal securities laws, ac-
tions for fraud were within the jurisdiction of the state courts. See id.
32 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
-" Defendant Agassiz was president and director, and defendant MacNaughton a
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tion without first seeking out the other actual ultimate party to the trans-
action and disclosing to him everything which a court or jury might later
find that he then knew affecting the real or speculative value of such
shares .... Fiduciary obligations of directors ought not to be made so
onerous that men of experience and ability will be deterred from accept-
ing such office.m
While the majority ofjurisdictions did not impose a duty of
disclosure on insiders, an exception developed known as the
"special facts" doctrine.39 In Strong, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged the majority rule, but stated that a trust relation-
ship and the concomitant duty to speak exist when the insider
knows special facts.40 The purpose of the special facts doctrine
was to eliminate inherently unfair transactions where a corpo-
rate insider intentionally withheld superior knowledge of essen-
tial facts to the shareholder's detriment.
Since there was no explicit method to distinguish ex-ante be-
tween those cases that satisfied the special facts exception and
those that did not, the exception either swallowed the majority
rule or made the rule impossible to administer consistently
42
Regardless, the common law actions in fraud did not sufficiently
protect shareholders from insiders who traded on impersonal
stock markets based on material nonpublic information. Due
to the increased importance of these impersonal markets, Con-
gress endeavored to better protect investors through the pas-
sage of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.44
' Id. See also Gladstone v. Murray Co., 50 N.E.2d 958, 960 (Mass. 1943) (officer of
a company did not have a fiduciary duty to individual stockholders); Shaw v. Cole
Mfg. Co., 177 S.W. 479, 480 (Tenn. 1915) (corporate directors have a trust relation-
ship only to the corporation itself, not to the individual shareholders).
'9 See Hegarty, supra note 21, at 817; see also Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
40 Strong, 213 U.S. at 431. See also Goodwin, 186 N.E. at 661 ("[W]here an [insider]
personally seeks a stockholder for the purpose of buying his shares without making
disclosure of material facts within his peculiar knowledge and not within the reach of
the stockholder, the transaction will be closely scrutinized and relief may be granted
in appropriate instances."); Buckley v. Buckley, 202 N.W. 955, 956 (Mich. 1925) (spe-
cial facts include events increasing the value of a corporation's stock that are known
by the insider, yet unknown and unascertainable from inspection of corporate books
by selling shareholders).
' Hegarty, supra note 21, at 817-18.42 WILIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 551 (concise 7th ed.
1995).
4 Hegarty, supra note 21, at 818-19.
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1996) (prohibiting fraud in the resale of securities be-
tween investors). See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("The
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock
1053
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C. § 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5
Reacting to the 1929 stock market crash and the impotency
of the common law to protect investors, Congress enacted the
Securities Act of 193345 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.46 These federal securities laws were passed "[t]o provide
fair and honest mechanisms for the pricing of securities, to as-
sure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue prefer-
ences or advantages among investors,... and to provide, to the
maximum degree practicable, markets that are open and or-
derly."47 In particular, Congress wanted to eliminate insiders'
grievous abuses of fiduciary duties committed solely for personal
profits in the securities markets."' Thus, a prohibition on in-
sider trading 9 developed under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.-o
Section 10(b) prohibits any "deceptive device" used "in
connection with" a securities transaction "in contravention of
[any] rules . . . the Commission may proscribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-
counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose
stock is listed on national securities exchanges."); see also Willis W. Hagen II, Insider
Trading under Rule lOb-5: The Theoretical Bases for Liability, 44 Bus. LAW. 13, 14 (1988).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1996) (proscribing fraud in the initial offers and sales
of securities). See Ernst &Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195 ("The Securities Act of 1933... was
designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning
public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and,
through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of
honesty and fair dealing").
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1996) (prohibiting fraud in the resale of securities be-
tween investors). See supra note 44.
,7 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 94-229, at 91-92 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179,
182.
48 Hegarty, supra note 21, at 819. See S. REP. No. 73-792, at 9 (1934) ("The [Ex-
change Act] further aims to protect the interests of the public by preventing direc-
tors, officers, and principal stockholders of a corporation, the stock of which is traded
in on exchanges, from speculating in the stock on the basis of information not avail-
able to others.").
"' Insider trading is the trading of securities by a person who possesses material in-
formation that is not yet available to the general public. Marcy G. Dworkin, The Mis-
appropriation Theory as a Corollary to the Classic Insider Trading Theory, 1996 ANN. SURv.
AM. L. 315, 315 (1996).
' Hegarty, supra note 21, at 819; Olson et al., supra note 20, at 230. See H.R. REP.
No. 100-910, at 8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. 6043, 6045 ("Section 10(b)..
. along with Rule 10b-5 ... [have] been subject to the most extensive judicial inter-
pretation. These provisions broadly prohibit fraudulent practices in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security, including trading while in possession of material,
nonpublic information.").
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tors."51 In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 2 under its §
10(b) rulemaking authority.5 Rule 10b-5 prohibits any person
from making "affirmative misrepresentations, half-truths or
omissions.., in connection with" a securities transaction. 4 Li-
ability under Rule lOb-5 extends only to conduct encompassed
by § 10(b)'s prohibitions.55 The majority of violations of § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 occur from material omissions5 6 rather than mis-
representations. 7 By their terms, § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 focus
not on unfair insider trading per se, but on deception and
fraud.5 "8 Since the failure to disclose a material fact becomes
fraudulent only when there is a duty to speak,59 courts have
grappled with the issue of when such a duty arises.6°
In a 1961 administrative proceeding, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission attempted to define when a duty to disclose
inside information arises before trading on that information. 1
In Cady, Roberts, a director of a corporation informed his broker
that the corporation decided to decrease its cash dividend by
40%.62 Upon receiving this inside information, but before it
had been publicized, the broker sold thousands of shares for his
personal account.63 The SEC found the broker's conduct a vio-
lation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.64 According to the SEC, a duty
to speak is based on two principal elements:
5' 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1996). See supra note 23 for the relevant text of§ 10(b).
52 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). See supra note 24 for the text of Rule 10b-5.
13 Finigan, supra note 17, at 697.
54 Id.
5' United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997); Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214
(1976).
" An omission is material when "'there [is] a substantial likelihood that the disclo-
sure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available.'" Basic, Inc. v. Lev-
inson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976)).
"Hegarty, supra note 21, at 820.
Olson et al., supra note 20, at 230. See supra notes 23 and 24 for the relevant text
of§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 respectively.
'9 See supra Part II.B.
o Hegarty, supra note 21, at 821.
61 In re Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). SeeHegarty, supra note 21, at 820-21.
62 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 909. The corporation decreased its dividend from
$0.625 to $0.375 per share. Id.
6Id.
'
4 Id. at 912.
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first, the existence of a relationship giving access ... to information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and not for the per-
sonal benefit of anyone, and second the inherent unfairness involved
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavail-
able to those with whom he is dealing.5
Accordingly, the Cady, Roberts rule meant that individuals who
have a special relationship with a company and are privy to its
internal affairs either must disclose such information before
trading or, if disclosure is impossible, abstain from trading.6
In 1968, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit extended the standard established in the Cady, Roberts
rule to individuals who are not necessarily insiders of the corpo-
ration. 67 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, a corporation made significant
mineral discoveries68 Based on this information, corporate di-
rectors and officers bought stock in their corporation without
disclosing their knowledge to the selling shareholders.6 The in-
siders' conduct, concluded the Second Circuit, violated § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.70 According to the Second Circuit, the central
purpose of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to ensure all investors
equal access to information.7 To accomplish this goal, the Sec-
ond Circuit imposed the Cady, Roberts rule on "anyone in posses-
sion of material inside information."72 Thus, this case broadened
the Cady, Roberts rule by emphasizing fairness rather than the
specific status of the trader.
Although Texas Gulf Sulphur was a government action, its
broad language created an outbreak of private lawsuits. 74 To re-
0 Id (footnote omitted).
Id. at 911. The disclose-or-abstain-from-trading principle under § 10(b) is known
as the Cady, Roberts rule. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. SEC, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d
Cir. 1968).
61 Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 847-48.
6Id. at 843-47.
61 Id. at 847-48.
70 Id. at 842.
7 a at 848-49 ("Rule lOb-5 is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have rela-
tively equal access to material information.").
Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
' Hegarty, supra note 21, at 821.
74 CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 42, at 573. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Although Texas Gulf
was an SEC injunction action, the strong public policy considerations behind our
[equal-access-to-information rule] there are equally applicable [in a private damage
action].").
1056 [Vol. 88
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duce this flurry of private litigation, the Supreme Court re-
stricted the Cady, Roberts rule in Santa Fe Industries v. Green by re-
quiring that the insiders' conduct be fraudulent, rather than
just unfair. Santa Fe Industries (Santa Fe) owned 95% of Kirby
Lumber Corporation common stock.76 In order to become the
sole shareholder, Santa Fe cashed out the minority shareholders
through a short-form merger statute." Although the provisions
of the statute were satisfied, 78 the minority shareholders claimed
that they received an unfairly low price for their shares. 9 Rather
than seek an appraisal remedy in state court, the minority
shareholders alleged that Santa Fe's low-ball price was a "decep-
tive device" used "in connection with" a securities transaction in
violation of § 10(b) and Rule IOb-5.80
The Supreme Court held that Santa Fe did not violate §
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 because its conduct was neither deceptive
nor manipulative.8' While the offer price may have been low,
Santa Fe fairly presented all relevant information to the minor-
ity shareholders, and, thus, could not have deceived or manipu-
lated them."' The Court held that breaches of fiduciary duty
"without any deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure"
do not violate § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. ss According to the ma-
jority, the essential purpose of the federal securities laws is full
disclosure: "[O]nce full and fair disclosure has occurred, the
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977).
76 Ia at 465.
I77 at 465-66. The short-form merger statute allows a parent corporation owning
at least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary to merge with, or buy out, that subsidiary if
approved by the parent's board of directors. DEL. CoDEANN. tit. 8 § 253 (1991). The
statute does not require approval from the minority shareholders who are bought
out. Id.7
9 To comply with the statute, Santa Fe informed the minority shareholders the day
after the short form merger became effective and notified them of their right to ob-
tain an appraisal in state court if displeased with the offer price per share. Santa Fe,
433 U.S. at 466. In addition, the minority shareholders received all relevant financial
data about Kirby and its assets, and an independent investment banking firm's ap-
praisal of the fair market value of their shares. Id.
79 Id. Santa Fe offered the minority shareholders $150 per share when the stock
was worth at least $772 per share based on the fair market value of Kirby's physical as-
sets. Id-
'o Id. at 467-68.
81 Id. at 474.
82 id.
3 Id. at 476.
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fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential
concern of [courts interpreting § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5] ...
D. CHIARELLA V. UNITED STATESAND DIRKS V SEC. THE FIDUCIARY
DUTY PRINCIPLE
Following Santa Fe, the Court decided Chiarella and Dirks,
which further restricted the Cady, Roberts rule by demanding
that the insider breach a fiduciary duty to the purchaser or
seller of securities. Vincent Chiarella was a printer employed at
Pandick Press, a financial printer. Chiarella was responsible
for five documents that announced corporate takeover bids."
Although these documents intentionally omitted the names of
the soon-to-be acquired company, Chiarella was able to deter-
mine the identity of the targets from other information con-
tained in the announcements." Without disclosing his
knowledge, Chiarella bought stock in the targets and sold the
shares immediately after the takeover bids were made public."
Through this scheme, Chiarella realized $30,000 in profits over
fourteen months.9' The SEC investigated his trading activities
and indicted Chiarella on seventeen counts of violating § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. 92 According to the government, Chiarella vio-
lated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he willfully bought securities
based upon: (1) inside information; and (2) undisclosed mate-
rial information he learned through his employment at the
print shop, in breach of a fiduciary duty to Pandick Press and its
customers.9 3 Chiarella was convicted on all counts in the district
court, and the Second Circuit affirmed his convictions.94
The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's convictions. 5 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Powell expressly rejected the theory
Id. at 477-78.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
86 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).





9' Id. at 235-36 (1980). The Court called this second prong of liability the misap-
propriation theory. See id. at 237 n.21.
Chiarella v. United States, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237.
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that a duty to disclose or abstain from trading could be based on
96
mere possession of inside information. Rather, the duty arises
when one party has information that the other party has the
right to know "because of a fiduciary or similar relationship of
trust and confidence between them."97 Since Chiarella was not a
corporate insider and did not receive inside information from
the target company, he had no fiduciary or similar duty to the
shareholders of the target corporation.9 Without such a rela-
tionship, Justice Powell concluded, Chiarella was not under a
duty to speak and, thus, was not "deceptive" in violation of §
10(b) and Rule lOb-5." The Court thus restricted the Cady, Rob-
erts rule by emphasizing the specific status of the trader 0°
While expressly rejecting the "equal access to information"
theory, the majority declined to explain or reach the merits of
the misappropriation theory of liability since it was not pre-
sented to the jury.'0
By contrast, in dissent, Chief Justice Burger addressed the
misappropriation theory and would have affirmed Chiarella's
102
convictions. While acknowledging that neither party to an
impersonal transaction is required to disclose inside informa-
tion absent some fiduciary relation, ChiefJustice Burger argued
that this general rule should "give way when an informational
advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or
industry, but by some unlawful means.' ' 3  According to the
'.Id. at 235. Without explicitly stating soJustice Powell mooted Texas Gulf Sulphur.
See Hegarty, supra note 21, at 849 n.66; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 ("We hold
that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of non-
public market information"). But see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
848 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must ei-
ther disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it [in order
to protect a corporate confidence], must abstain from trading in or recommending
the securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed").
"Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
9Id. at 232.
9 Id. at 232-33.
" See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory and the
New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to Effwienqy and Back, 52 ALB. L. REv. 775,
823 (1989).
io Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
' Id. at 239 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
o3 Id. at 240 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
1059
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Chief Justice, if an individual misappropriates' °4 material infor-
mation, then he has "an absolute duty" to either disclose that in-
formation to the other party of the securities transaction or refrain
from trading.105 Accordingly, Chiarella violated § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 when he traded on misappropriated nonpublic in-
formation without informing the selling shareholders of the
target companies.1 6
Three years after Chiarella, the Supreme Court extended the
requirement of a breach of a fiduciary duty to tippers/tippees of
inside information. 0 7 As an officer of a New York broker-dealer
firm, Raymond Dirks provided financial analysis of insurance
company securities to institutional investors." 8 Through a for-
mer officer of a major insurance company, Dirks learned that
the company was fraudulently overstating the value of its as-
sets.' 9 Dirks verified the former officer's allegations through his
own investigation of the insurance company. 0 While Dirks
never owned or traded the insurance company's securities, he
did openly discuss the fraud with many of his clients.' In re-
sponse, Dirks' clients liquidated over $16 million of the insur-
ance company's securities."' The SEC's investigation of Dirks'
role in the exposure of the fraud resulted in Dirks' conviction
for violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." According to the SEC, a
tippee like Dirks who learns material information that he knows
is confidential and that he knows or should know came from a
corporate insider must either publicly disclose that information
or abstain from trading.1
4
' Misappropriation means "[t]he unauthorized, improper, or unlawful use of
property for a purpose other than that for which intended." BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY
998 (6th ed. 1990).
'0' Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
06 d.
'07 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).





"' Id. at 650-51. The SEC held that Dirks had aided and abetted violations of §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by repeating the allegations of fraud to his clients who later
sold their stock in the insurance company. See id.
"' See id. at 651. This is true regardless of the tippee's motivation or occupation.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Powell reversed Dirks' con-
victions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.115 The majority unambi-
guously stated that the duty to disclose or abstain from trading
arises from a fiduciary relationship between the parties to the
securities transaction and not from the mere possession of in-
side information.1 16 Since Dirks was a stranger to the insurance
company, he had no pre-existing duty to its shareholders."7
In addition, the Court held that Dirks did not "inherit" any
fiduciary duty to the shareholders."8 According to Justice Pow-
ell, a tippee's duty to disclose or abstain from trading derives
from the insider tipper's duty. 9 This duty does not arise merely
from receiving inside information; rather, it is triggered by ob-
taining information from an insider who has breached a fiduci-
ary duty to the corporation and the tippee knows or should
know of the breach.2' According to the majority, the insider
did not breach a fiduciary duty to the corporation because he
was motivated to "expose the fraud," not to "directly or indi-
rectly personally benefit."'' Moreover, the insider did not ex-
pect Dirks to keep the information confidential and Dirks did
not misappropriate the information about the insurance com-
pany 2 2 Thus, the Court concluded, Dirks was not "deceptive"
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because he neither had a pre-
existing duty to speak, nor did he inherit such a duty from the
insider123
" Id. at 667.
,,6 Id. at 657-58. Justice Powell stressed that:
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be no duty to disclose where
the person who has traded on insige information was not the [corporation's]
agent.... was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the
securties] had placed their trust and confidence.
I& at 654.
"
7 Id. at 665.
US I& at 665-66.
" Id. at 659.
"Old. at 660.
'2' Id. at 667.
"2Id. at 665.
' Id. at 666-67. In addition, Justice Powell rejected the SEC's argument that §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 distinguish between corporate information and market infor-
mation. Id. at 656 n.15. See also Brudney, supra note 20, at 329-33 (no justification for
federal securities laws to distinguish between corporate and market information).
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E. AFTER CHIARELLA AND DIRKS: THE ERA OF THE
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
By holding that the trader must have a fiduciary duty to the
other party of a securities transaction, Chiarella and Dirks re-
stricted the reach of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.124 This standard al-
lowed outsiders, who owe no fiduciary duty to the corporation
or its shareholders, to trade on material nonpublic information
without violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.'2
To remedy this situation,126 the SEC espoused the misap-
propriation theory based on Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
Chiarella127 Under the misappropriation theory, a breach of fi-
duciary duty to the source of the inside information, regardless
of any duty to any other party to a securities transaction, fol-
lowed by the use of that information to trade securities, violates
§ 10(b) and Rule IOb-5's prohibition against "deceptive devices"
used "in connection with" a securities transaction. Because
the misappropriation theory prohibits fraud on the source of
the information instead of the purchaser or seller of securities
as was required in Chiarella and Dirks, some courts of appeals
were ambivalent about the misappropriation theory.'9
However, the Second Circuit endorsed the misappropria-
tion theory even before the holding in Dirks.130 In Newman, two
employees of two investment banking firms misappropriated
confidential information regarding potential mergers and ac-
quisitions that was entrusted to their employer by corporate cli-
ents.13' The two employees covertly conveyed the mis-
appropriated information to Newman, a securities trader and
14 Hegarty, supra note 21, at 826.
125 Id.
126 Because of the increasing number of mergers and corporate takeovers, the Chi-
arella standard permitted many nonfiduciary insider traders to go unpunished. I&
127 Id See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 23945 (1980) (Burger, GJ., dis-
senting).
" Hegarty, supra note 21, at 827. In contrast to the misappropriation theory, the
classical theory as used in Chiarella holds that a corporate insider, such as a director,
officer, or controlling shareholder, violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he uses con-
fidential information for personal securities trading purposes, in breach of a fiduciary
duty owed to the other party to the securities transaction. See O'Hagan v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
' Dworkin, supra note 49, at 337.
12 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding the validity of
the misappropriation theory).
I' I& at 15.
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manager of the over-the-counter trading department of a New
York brokerage firm, who in turn conveyed it to two of his con-
federates. Using secret foreign bank and trust accounts,
Newman and his two counterparts profited by purchasing stock
in the target companies and immediately selling when the take-
overs were publicly announced.
The government charged Newman with conduct violating §
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 based on the misappropriation theory.'4
The district court dismissed the complaint,'- but the Second
Circuit reversed, agreeing with the Government's application of
the misappropriation theory.3M  According to the Second Cir-
cuit, Newman and his cohorts "defrauded [the investment bank-
ing firms] as surely as if they took their money."3 7 The court
also quickly disposed of the "in connection with" requirement
since Newman's only purpose for participating in this scheme
was to profit from trading securities in the target companies.'3
Thus, Newman represents the first time a court held that § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 liability could be based upon the misappropria-
tion theory.1
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit rejected the validity of the
misappropriation theory in United States v. Bryan 40 Elton Bryan,
132 Id.
' Id.
" Id. at 14.
5 Id The district court concluded that no "clear and definite statement" in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gave Newman reasonable notice that his conduct was
unlawful. IM
3 Id. at 16.
37Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
13 Hagen, supra note 44, at 24. For other Second Circuit cases that support the
misappropriation theory, see United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993), United
States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), Carpenter v. United States, 791 F.2d 1024
(2d Cir. 1986), and SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984). For other circuits
that approve the misappropriation theory, see SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir.
1995), SECv. Cherif 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), SECv. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.
1990), and Rothbergv. Rosenbloora, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985).
In Chestman, the Second Circuit affirmed the validity of the misappropriation the-
ory, but held that the defendant had not violated § 10(b) because he had not
breached any fiduciary duty. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 570-71. In his partial concur-
rence, Judge Winter cogently analyzed the misappropriation theory from a "property
rights in inside information" perspective and would have upheld Chestman's convic-
tions under § 10(b) based on the misappropriation theory. Id. at 572, 576-81 (Win-
terJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
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the director of the West Virginia Lottery (Lottery), was respon-
sible for negotiating and securing $2.8 million worth of advertis-
ing contracts."4 After Lottery officials decided which advertising
companies to award the contracts, but before that information
was publicly announced, Bryan purchased common stock in the
"winning" advertising companies. The government claimed
that, in so doing, Bryan violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 based
on the misappropriation theory.4 3 The district court convicted
Bryan,'1 but the Fourth Circuit unanimously reversed.
14 1
According to the Fourth Circuit, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
proscribed only "the use of deception, in the form of material
misrepresentations or omissions, to induce action or inaction by
purchasers or sellers of securities . ,1"6 By contrast, the court
reasoned, the misappropriation theory is too broad; it allows
criminal conviction for mere breaches of fiduciary duty, regard-
less of whether the breach involves deception and whether the
parties deceived are purchasers or sellers of securities.47
While the appellate courts were busy with the misappropria-
tion theory,148 the Supreme Court's lone statement on the the-
ory came in Carpenter v. United States.49 R. Foster Winans was a
reporter for the Wall Street Journal Journal).'° In the summer of
1982, he began writing a daily column, Heard on the Street, which
discussed the profitability potential of selected stocks. 5' Due to
its perceived quality and integrity, the column had the potential
of affecting the price of the stocks which it discussed.5 2 Winans
was aware of the Journal's official policy which deemed the con-
tents of the column the Journa's own confidential information
prior to publication. Despite that rule, Winans gave two
141 Id. at 937.
112 Id. at 939.
,41 Id. at 936.
144 Id
145 I&
... Id. at 944.
147 Id.
48 See supra note 139.
.4. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
0 Id. at 22.
151 Id.
112 Id See United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("We find
that the Heard column does have an impact on the market, difficult though it may be
to qualify in any particular case.").
15 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23.
1064 [Vol. 88
1998] Rule lOb-5 & THE MTSAPPROPRTATION THEORY
friends advance notice of the timing and content of his forth-
coming columns.154 Consequently, these friends were able to
trade securities based on the likely impact of the column on the
market price of the discussed securities. For four months,
Winans' confederates made prepublication trades based on the
advanced information.' s Winans and his associates shared in
over $690,000 in profits.5 7 The Government alleged, and the
district court convicted, Winans of violating § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 under the misappropriation theory. 5 The Second Circuit
affirmed Winan's convictions based in part on its decision in
Newman. 59
On review, the Supreme Court cursorily addressed the mis-
appropriation theory: "The Court is evenly divided with respect
to the convictions under the securities laws [based on the mis-
appropriation theory] and for that reason affirms the judgment
below on those counts."'' 6 Due to this even split, the Court
merely affirmed the findings of the Second Circuit without
adopting or rejecting the misappropriation theory of securities
fraud.16' As a result, the validity of the misappropriation theory
was undecided until the O'Hagan Court expressly invoked it to
impose § 10(b) and Rule l0b-5 liability. 62
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
James Herman O'Hagan was an attorney at Dorsey & Whit-
ney, a law firm located in Minneapolis, Minnesota.'6 In July,
1988, Grand Metropolitan PLC, a company based in London,
England, hired Dorsey as counsel to represent Grand Met in a





0 Id. at 23-24.
'5' United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031-34 (2d Cir. 1986).
60 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24. There were only eight sittingJustices at the time Car-
penterwas decided because Justice Powell had retired butJustice Kennedy had not yet
been seated. Id. at iv (note page). In addition, the Court unanimously upheld the
defendant's convictions under the mail and wire fraud statutes. Id. at 24-28. See infra
Part IV.A.1.
.1 Hagen, supra note 44, at 28.




pany, headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota.'4 Both Grand
Met and Dorsey made significant attempts to keep the planned
tender offer confidential.'
While Dorsey was still counsel to Grand Met, but before
Grand Met had publicly announced its tender offer plans,
O'Hagan engaged in a series of transactions involving Pillsbury's
securities.'6 On August 18, 1988, O'Hagan made his first pur-
chase of Pillsbury call options, with each option representing
the right to purchase 100 shares of Pillsbury common stock.'6 7
By August 25, 1988, O'Hagan had accumulated 500 Pillsbury
call options. On August 29, 1988, O'Hagan bought another
100 Pillsbury call options, and, within twenty-four hours, he
purchased 150 more Pillsbury call options.10 By the end of Sep-
tember, 1988, O'Hagan owned 2,500 Pillsbury call options, mak-
ing him the largest individual investor in Pillsbury call options
in the world.' 70 On September 9, 1988, Dorsey withdrew from its
representation of Grand Met.17' On September 20, 1988,
O'Hagan made his last transaction in Pillsbury securities when
he purchased 5000 shares of Pillsbury common stock.'72
In October, 1988, Grand Met publicly announced its tender
offer, and the price of Pillsbury common stock increased from
$39 to nearly $60 a share.7  At this point, O'Hagan liquidated
164 1&
'6 Petitioner's Brief at 3-4, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997) (No.
96-842). Only seven or eight people within Grand Met were aware of the planned
tender offer before it was publicly announced. Id. For its part, Dorsey restricted
communication of the information to as few people as possible within the firm, filed
the subject of the representation under "general matters," and imposed a written pol-
icy that Grand Met's planned tender offer information be kept strictly confidential.
Id.
'I Id- at 5-6.
161 Id. at 5. The owner of a call option has the right to buy a fixed amount of the
underlying stock at a predetermined price until a specific future date, in exchange
for a premium today. For investors who believe a stock will rise dramatically, call op-
tions permit a profit from a smaller initial investment than would be required to buy
the underlying stock outright. Id. at 6.
'68 1& at 5.
169 I.
170 Im.
17 Id. at 5 n.2. Dorsey withdrew because it believed that it was a bad idea to repre-
sent Grand Met in the takeover of a local Minneapolis company. Id. at 4.
112 1& at 5.
7 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1997).
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all of his holdings in Pillsbury call options and common stock,
making a profit of more than $4.3 million.'7
The SEC investigated O'Hagan's transactions and, although
O'Hagan never personally worked on the legal representation
of Grand Met,175 charged him with fifty-seven violations of fed-
eral securities laws.'76 O'Hagan was charged with defrauding
both Dorsey and Grand Met when he misappropriated confi-
dential information regarding Grand Met's planned tender of-
fer for personal trading purposes."7 Specifically, the indictment
alleged that O'Hagan violated § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) 178 and SEC Rule 10b-5179
based on the misappropriation theory of securities fraud.80 In
addition, O'Hagan was charged with violating § 14(e) of the Ex-
change Act s' and SEC Rule 14e-3(a), 8' which, even where there
17 id'
"'Respondent's Brief at 4-6, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997) (No.
96-842).
,'-OHagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
78 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1996). See supra note 23 for the relevant text of § 10(b).
"'9 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). See supra note 24 for the text of Rule lOb-5.
o O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205. The classical theory, see supra note 128, did not ap-
ply to O'Hagan since he was not an insider of Pillsbury, the corporation in whose
stock he traded, and thus owed no fiduciary duty to the sellers of Pillsbury common
stock and call options. Id. at 2208 n.5.
'8, In relevant part, § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statemenit of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not mislead-
ing, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices,
in connection with any tender offer ... The Commission shall, for the purposes
of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed t6 prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipu-
lative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1996) (emphasis added).
82 Rule 14e-3(a) was adopted pursuant to the Commission's § 14(e) rulemaking
authority and states:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudu-
lent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section
14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in possession of material informa-
tion relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to
know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired
directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer,
or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting
on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause
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is no breach of a fiduciary duty, prohibit trading while in posses-
sion of material nonpublic information regarding a tender of-
fer.83 Finally, O'Hagan was charged with violating federal mail
fraud and money laundering statutess 4 O'Hagan was convicted
on all fifty-seven counts by a jury in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota."" He was sentenced to
forty-one months imprisonment. s
8
On appeal, a divided panel for the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed all of O'Hagan's convictions. 7 Follow-
ing the lead of the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Bryan,'ss the
Eighth Circuit held that neither the statutory language of §
10(b), nor the Supreme Court's interpretations of that lan-
guage, supports use of the misappropriation theory of securities
fraud.' 9 Under the misappropriation theory, an individual vio-
lates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he: "(1) misappropriates ma-
terial nonpublic information (2) by breaching a duty arising out
of a relationship of trust and confidence and (3) uses that in-
formation in a securities transaction, (4) regardless of whether
he owed any duties to the shareholders of the traded stock."'90
to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible
into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to ob-
tain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reason-
able time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are
publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R § 240.14e-3(a) (1996) (emphasis added).
130 'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
184 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1996); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a) (1) (B) (i), 1957 (1996).
The jury rejected O'Hagan's defense that he did not possess material, nonpub-
lic information regarding Grand Met's tender offer when he purchased Pillsbury
stock and call options. See Reply Brief at 2, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997) (No. 96-842).
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
117 United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 613 (8th Cir. 1996).
1s 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding the misappropriation theory an invalid ba-
sis upon which to impose § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability). See supra notes 140-47 and
accompanying text.
"
90'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 622. The Eighth Circuit relied on Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (holding that a duty to speak arises when one party has in-
formation that the other party has the right to know because of a fiduciary relation-
ship between them), Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983) (affirming the holding
in Chiarella), and Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994) (holding that a private plaintiff does not have standing to bring an aiding
and abetting suit under § 10(b)). O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618-19, 622.
10 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 616-17.
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According to the Government, O'Hagan violated § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 when he learned material nonpublic informa-
tion relating to Grand Met's planned tender offer through his
employment at Dorsey and subsequently used that information
for personal securities trading purposes.'9' In rejecting the mis-
appropriation theory, the Eighth Circuit noted that "deception"
is not a required element of the misappropriation theory, nor
must any potential deception be "in connection with" a securi-
ties transaction as specified in § 10(b). 19' Relying on Chiarella,"'
Dirks,"' and Central Bank of Denver,95 the Eighth Circuit stated
that "only a breach of a duty to parties to the securities transac-
tion or, at the most, to other market participants such as inves-
tors" can create liability under § 10(b).196
The Eighth Circuit also held that Rule 14e-3 (a) 97 is an inva-
lid exercise of the Commission's rulemaking authority under §
14(e).198 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that "fraudulent" under §
14(e) requires "the breach of a fiduciary obligation or similar
trust relationship," and, therefore, Rule 14e-3(a) cannot stand
without such a requirement)9
Finally, the Eighth Circuit reversed O'Hagan's mail fraud
and money laundering convictions because they were based on
violations of § 10(b) and § 14(e) and could not be maintained
once these convictions were overturned.2 °]
On petition from the Government, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari20 ' to determine whether the statutory lan-
guage of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 supports the misappropriation
theory of securities fraud and whether Rule 14e-3(a) is a proper
SId. at 617.
"Id. See supra note 23 for the relevant text of § 10(b).
'" 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
'9' 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
"511 U.S. 164 (1994).
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618.
' See supra note 182 for the text of Rule 14e-3(a).
'98 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 627. The Eighth Circuit relied on Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980), and Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Ina, 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (hold-
ing that the term "manipulative" in § 14(e) requires misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure). O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 625.
9 O'Hagan, 92 F.2d at 626-27.
20 Id. at 628.
2" United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
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exercise of the Commission's rulemaking authority under §
14(e) .202
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,2 3 Justice Ginsberg reversed the
Eighth Circuit's judgment, holding that the statutory language
of § 10(b) and Supreme Court precedent2 4 validate the misap-
propriation theory of securities fraud.20 5 Rejecting the Eighth
Circuit's contentions, Justice Ginsberg found that the misap-
propriation theory requires both a "deceptive device or contriv-
ance" and that the deception be "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of securities as stated in § 10(b) .20 The major-
ity also held that Rule 14e-3(a), "to the extent relevant to this
case," constitutes a valid exercise of the Commission's rulemak-
ing authority under § 14(e). °7 Finally, the Court concluded
O'Hagan violated the mail fraud and money laundering stat-
utes.208
1. § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
First, Justice Ginsberg observed that a misappropriator, like
O'Hagan, "who [pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly
converting the principal's information for personal gain,...
[defrauds] the principal."209 In rejecting O'Hagan's argument
that he merely converted Grand Met's confidential information,
Justice Ginsberg noted that O'Hagan's conduct "deal[t] in de-
ception. 21 0
In finding that O'Hagan's conduct was deceptive, Justice
Ginsberg relied on Carpenter v. United States,211 which concerned
the mail fraud statute's prohibition of "any scheme or artifice to
22United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1997).
203Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyerjoined injustice Gins-
berg's opinion.
204 See supra note 189 for a discussion of the Supreme Court precedent.
2 0'OHagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205-06.
I. at 2208-09.
7 Id. at 2214.
2 Id. at 2220.
id. at 2208.
210 Id
21' 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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defraud."212 In Carpenter, the Supreme Court unanimously af-
firmed the defendant's convictions under the mail fraud statute
and recognized that an employee commits fraud when, promis-
ing not to use his employer's confidential information, he gave
the information to his co-conspirators to obtain trading prof-
its.21 According to the Carpenter Court, a company's confiden-
tial information is property to which the company has the right
of exclusive use; the furtive misappropriation of that informa-
tion constitutes fraud similar to embezzlement.21 4 Like the de-
fendant in Carpenter, O'Hagan's promise not to use Grand Met's
confidential information became a "deceptive device" when he
used this information in a scheme to obtain trading profits.1
Thus, Justice Ginsberg found that O'Hagan had deceived both
Dorsey and Grand Met.
216
In addition to finding deception in this specific case, Justice
Ginsberg found that the misappropriation theory, in general, is
not based merely on a breach of a fiduciary duty as O'Hagan
claimed, but rather on "deception through nondisclosure" to
the source of the information.2 Because of this essential ele-
ment of deception, Justice Ginsberg found the misappropria-
tion theory consistent with Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,
218
which held that § 10(b) outlaws only manipulation or decep-
tion, not simply a breach of fiduciary duty. 19 Accordingly, when
the misappropriator comes clean and fully discloses to the
source his scheme to use the nonpublic information, there is no
"deceptive device" and thus no § 10(b) liability under the mis-
22 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1996)).
21 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27.
214 Id at 25-27.
2- O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
2, Id Manipulation, the other type of conduct creating § 10(b) liability, was not
relevant to O'Hagan because it is "virtually a term of art when used in connection
with the securities markets, referring to such practices as wash sales, matched orders,
or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
activity," and there was no evidence that O'Hagan engaged in such conduct. United
States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 615 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
21* O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
28 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text discussing
Santa F
29 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473-76.
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appropriation theory. ° Since O'Hagan never fully informed
Dorsey or Grand Met of his clandestine trading scheme, Justice
Ginsberg held that O'Hagan's conduct was "deceptive" under §
10(b) 22.
Next, Justice Ginsberg concluded that O'Hagan's deception
was "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities as re-
quired under § 10(b).22 Justice Ginsberg rejected O'Hagan's
argument that this element can be satisfied only if an actual
purchaser or seller of securities is deceived, emphasizing that §
10(b) refers to "the purchase or sale of any security.023 Accord-
ing to Justice Ginsberg, this requirement of § 10(b) was satisfied
because O'Hagan's deception was complete, not when he
learned of Grand Met's confidential information, but only after
he secretly used the information to trade securities. 4 The secu-
rities transaction and the deception occurred simultaneously.
2 5
So ruling, Justice Ginsberg limited the scope of the misap-
propriation theory. 6 First, Justice Ginsberg explained that
O'Hagan would not have violated § 10(b) if he had used Grand
Met's confidential information in other potentially profitable
ways, such as selling it to the Wall Street Journal or using it in a
fantasy stock trading game. 7 The misappropriation theory does
not prohibit all possible forms of deception involving confiden-
tial information, but only deceptive uses through securities
2281transactions. Second, Justice Ginsberg concluded that
O'Hagan would not have breached § 10(b) if he had embezzled
cash from Grand Met, and subsequently used the money in a se-
229curities transaction. In this type of situation, the "in connec-
tion with" requirement would not be satisfied because the
deception would be accomplished as soon as O'Hagan obtained
22 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209. Justice Ginsberg altered ChiefJustice Burger's ver-
sion of the misappropriation theory, since the Chief Justice believed the misappro-
priator had "an absolute duty" to disclose the information to the one with whom he
trades. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing).
2' O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2211.
m Id.
223 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1996)).
22, Id at 2209.
2I2
226 rd
22 Id. at 2210 n.8.
228 Id. at 2209.
mIaf.
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the money, regardless of any subsequent securities transac-
tion.3 °
To bolster her conclusion, Justice Ginsberg analyzed the
underlying purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.231
According to Justice Ginsberg, the misappropriation theory
comports well with a central objective of § 10(b) "to insure hon-
est securities markets and thereby promote investor confi-
dence. ''s 2 Although it is impossible to ensure equal access and
total parity of information to all investors in the securities mar-
kets, investors likely would hesitate to risk their money in a se-
curities market where the law condoned O'Hagan's conduct:
trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information. 3
This hesitation, according to Justice Ginsberg, stems from the
fact that O'Hagan's informational advantage is based on "con-
trivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that the uninformed in-
vestor cannot overcome with research or skill."2M Thus,
considering the adverse effect on market integrity from
O'Hagan's conduct and the underlying goals of § 10(b), Justice
Ginsberg found that it would be illogical to hold O'Hagan liable
under the classical theory if he represented Pillsbury,2  but not




Finally, according to Justice Ginsberg, the Eighth Circuit
misread prior Supreme Court holdings as precluding § 10(b) li-
ability under the misappropriation theory.23' The Eighth Cir-
2M id.
2" Id. at 2210.
2 Id. (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 60,412 (1980)).
233 Id.
234 i'd
See supra note 180.
'6 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210-11. In addition, Justice Ginsberg rejected
O'Hagan's claim that the misappropriation theory would violate his due process right
to fair notice of what is criminal conduct. Id. at 2214. She stated that in order to im-
pose criminal liability under Rule 10b-5, the Government must establish that an indi-
vidual "willfully" violated the provision. Id. (relying on 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1996)).
Furthermore, an individual may not be imprisioned if he proves that he had no
knowledge of Rule 10b-5. Id. Accordingly, O'Hagan's due process rights were not
violated since criminal liability is limited to individuals who breach a recognized duty
and who have culpable intent. Id.
27 Id. at 2211 ("According to the Eighth Circuit, three of our decisions reveal that
§ 10(b) liability cannot be predicated on a duty owed to the source of the informa-
tion."). See supra note 189 for a discussion of the Supreme Court precedent.
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cuit's reliance on Chiarella v. United States,238 said Justice Gins-
berg, was misplaced since that case expressly left unanswered
the validity of the misappropriation theory.2 9 Dirks v. SE] 40 also
left open the validity of the misappropriation theory.241 Dirks did
not suggest that a person who misappropriates nonpublic in-
formation in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source avoids §
10(b) liability. 42 Finally, Justice Ginsberg dismissed the Eighth
Circuit's reading of Central Bank of Denver v. First National Bank of
Denver43 as irrelevant to the instant case.244 The issue before the
Court in Central Bank was whether a private plaintiff could main-
tain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b), not criminal li-
ability.
25
Accordingly, Justice Ginsberg concluded that Supreme
Court precedent did not prohibit the imposition of § 10(b) li-
ability based on a duty owed to the source of the nonpublic in-
formation.246 Therefore, Justice Ginsberg held that criminal
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may be based on the mis-
appropriation theory of securities fraud. 47
2. § 14(e) and Rule 14e-3(a)
Justice Ginsberg next concluded that Rule 14e-3(a),248 "to
the extent relevant to this case," is a valid exercise of the SEC's §
14(e) 2 9 rulemaking authority, even though Rule 14e-3(a) does
not require the breach of any fiduciary duty.20 The Court did
not determine the scope of the SEC's power to define fraud un-
der § 14(e).25 Rather, Justice Ginsberg held that Rule 14e-3 (a)
445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980) ("We need not decide whether [the misappropriation]
theory has merit for it was not submitted to the jury.").
"90'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212.
2'0 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
241 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212. In Dirks, the Court observed that the principal did
not expect Dirks to keep the information in confidence. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665. Nor
did Dirks misappropriate the confidential information. Id.
212 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213.
W 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
244 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213.
245 Id.
46 Id. at 2211.
247 I& at 2205.
248 See supra note 182 for the text of Rule 14e-3(a).
241 See supra note 181 for the text of§ 14(e).
" O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
2" Id. at 2217.
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represents a "means reasonably designed to prevent" fraud in
tender offers under § 14(e) .2 Citing SEC v. Peters, s Justice
Ginsberg found that it was a "fair assumption" by the SEC to
conclude that trading based on confidential information often
will involve a breach of a fiduciary duty either to the acquirer or
acquiree.2 4 This breach, furthermore, would be difficult to
prove in tender offers since a wide range of insiders, including
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders, and outsiders,
such as lawyers, investment bankers, and accountants, have ac-
cess to the confidential information.25 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that Rule 14e-3(a) could create a "disclose or abstain
from trading" principle without requiring specific evidence of a
breach of fiduciary duty.
2 56
3. Mail Fraud and Money Laundering Statutes
Finally, Justice Ginsberg reinstated O'Hagan's convictions
under the mail fraud and money laundering statutes because
"the indictment was so structured that the mail fraud [and
money laundering] charges could not be disassociated from
[O'Hagan's violations of § 10(b) and § 14(e)] ....", Thus, the
Court's decision on the securities fraud issues "require[d]" a
conviction under the mail fraud and money laundering stat-
utes.258
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S PARTIAL CONCURRENCE
Justice Scalia rejected the misappropriation theory of secu-
rities fraud because it violates the principle of lenity.259 Since it
22 id.
2 978 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1992). According to the Tenth Circuit,
"[p]articularly in the context of a tender offer,... [it is] almost impossible to prove
that [a] trader obtained [material nonpublic information] in breach of a fiduciary
duty owed either by the trader or by the ultimate insider source of the information."
Id. at 1167.
21 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2219.
Id
217 Id at 2219-20.
m Id. at 2220.
2 9 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Reno v. Koray, 515
U.S. 50, 64-65 (1995) (the rule of lenity applies when, after gathering aid from all
possible sources, a court can only guess as to the intent of Congress); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) (if a choice has to be made between two readings of
what conduct is criminal, Congress must, before the Court chooses the harsher alter-
native, speak in language that is clear and definite).
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is not clear to whom § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply, Justice Scalia
concluded that the vague statutory language must be restricted
to deceptive devices used on an actual purchaser or seller of se-
curities.2"
C. JUSTICE THOMAS'S PARTIAL CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas rejected the misappropriation theory of se-
curities fraud because it does not provide a "coherent and con-
sistent" interpretation of § 10(b)'s requirement that the
deception be "in connection with" the purchase or sale of secu-
rities. 61 According to Justice Thomas, the critical issue under
the misappropriation theory is that the information is nonpub-
lic, not that the source of the information is deceived.2 62 Using
the majority's own words, Justice Thomas reasoned that "[t] here
can be no 'deceptive device' under the misappropriation theory
if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on
the nonpublic information. 263 Yet, regardless of whether there
is full disclosure, Justice Thomas argued, the adverse effects on
the integrity of the market would be identical: "[O'Hagan]
would still be trading based on nonpublic information that the
average investor had no hope of obtaining through his own [re-
search or skill] .,,26 Therefore, the misappropriation theory does
not satisfy the "in connection with" requirement under § 10(b)
because the deceptive device is irrelevant to the integrity of any
future trading.2
With regard to Rule 14e-3(a), Justice Thomas found that it
was not a valid exercise of the SEC's § 14(e) rulemaking author-
ity.26 According to Justice Thomas, it is just as difficult to prove
breach of a fiduciary duty in the § 14(e) tender offer context as
260 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2202 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion with respect to O'Hagan's convic-
tions under § 14(e) and the federal mail fraud and money laundering statutes. Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia did not join Jus-
tice Thomas's dissent because Justice Scalia believed it irrelevant whether the Gov-
ernment's misappropriation theory provides a "coherent and consistent"
interpretation of§ 10(b). Id. (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2Id. at 2221 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).2 Id. at 2225 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2631 & (Thomas,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting i&. at 2209).
'6' Id (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26 Id- at 2226 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2'Id. (Thomas,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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it is under the § 10(b) misappropriation theory. 67 Since there is
no particular difficulty in proving a breach of fiduciary duty,
removing the requirement of such a breach under Rule 14e-
3(a) is not a "means reasonably designed to prevent" fraud in
tender offers under § 14(e). 6
V. ANALYSIS
The Court was correct in its judgment that the misappro-
priation theory satisfies the requirements of § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. The misappropriation theory is consistent with Supreme
Court interpretations of § 10(b)'s statutory language, including
Chiarella v. United State2 69 and Dirks v. SEC.270 By prohibiting
trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information, the
misappropriation theory preserves property rights in informa-
tion and elevates investor confidence in the securities market.
This, in turn, promotes market efficiency and integrity. Finally,
the misappropriation theory satisfies the "in connection with"
requirement of § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.
A. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE
HOLDINGS IN CHIARELLA AND DIRKS
In Chiarella and Dirks, the Court unequivocally established
that a person violates § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 when he trades se-
curities on the basis of material nonpublic information in
breach of a fiduciary or similar relationship to the other party of
271
a securities transaction. While these two cases seem to con-
tradict the misappropriation theory's prohibition of "fraud-on-
the-source," Chiarella and Dirks did not deny that there are other
ways to violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 272
In ChiarellaJustice Powell declined to rule on the validity of
the misappropriation theory since it was not submitted to the
2 Id. at 2229 (ThomasJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). With respect to
O'Hagan's convictions under the federal mail fraud and money laundering statutes,
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment of the majority. Id at 2230 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
270 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
2'Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
22 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212.
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jury.23 Furthermore, Justice Stevens, supplying the crucial fifth
vote for the Powell majority, wrote separately to emphasize that
the Court did not determine the validity of the misappropria-
tion theory. 4 In Dirks, Justice Powell reaffirmed the holding in
Chiarella, unambiguously stating that a duty to disclose arises
from the relationship between the parties and not simply from
possession of inside information.275 While this appears to un-
dermine the credibility of the misappropriation theory, Justice
Powell then stressed that there was no expectation by Dirks'
source that he would keep their information in confidence.276
Nor did Dirks misappropriate the information. 7 The Court's
emphasis on the lack of misappropriating conduct by Dirks was
dicta since Justice Powell already had concluded that Dirks did
not violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 2 7 8 As such, it suggests that
the Dirks Court would have reached the opposite result had
Dirks misappropriated the confidential information.2 Some
authors have argued that the Court's focus on Dirks' conduct
signaled an implicit acceptance of the misappropriation the-
ory.2" At a minimum, it left open the question of the viability of
281the misappropriation theory. In conclusion, Chiarella and
Dirks "wrote one chapter with respect to one type of fraudulent
trading,, 282 but left the chapter on the misappropriation theory
an unfinished manuscript.
27- Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236 ("We will not speculate upon whether such a breach
[to Chiarella's employer and its clients] constitutes a violation of § 10(b).").
7' Id. at 237-38 (Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that:
[t]he Court correctly does not address the second [theory of liability]: whether
[Chiarella's] breach of his duty of silence--a duty he unquestionably owed to his
employer and to his employer s customers--could give rise to criminal liability
under Rule 10b-5. I think the Court wisely leaves the resolution of this issue for
another day.
Id. (StevensJ, concurring).
275 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654, 657-58.
26 Id- at 665.
2
n id.
2' Id. ("Under the inside-trading and tipping rules [already discussed], we find
that there was no actionable violation by Dirks").
27 Mark A. Clayton, Comment, The Misappropriation Theorj in Light of Carpenter and
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 185, 197
& n.95 (1989).
2'0 Id. See also Dworkin, supra note 49, at 359-64.
281 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2213-14 (1997).
2'2 United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd in part and
rev'd in part, United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aftd, Carpenter
v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
1078 [Vol. 88
1998] Rule lOb-5 & THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
B. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY PROMOTES EFFICIENCYAND
INTEGRITY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS
As stressed by the Second Circuit, "[o]ur era aptly has been
styled, and may well be remembered as, the age of informa-
,,283tion. Nowhere is information more valuable and volatile
than in the financial market, where facts can be worth millions
of dollars when secret but rendered worthless once publicized .
Information is costly to produce because it requires research
costs. 2s' For example, many investors perform technical analysis
before they buy or sell stock.2s" Technical analysis is the "search
for recurrent and predictable patterns in stock prices. Techni-
cal analysts are sometimes called 'chartists' because they study
records or charts of past stock prices, hoping to find patterns
they can exploit to make a profit."2 7 While information is ex-
pensive to create, it is "less costly, or even free" to use since it in-
volves facts and ideas that easily can be copied.2ss This, in turn,
creates an omnipresent risk that those who expend resources to
produce information will see free-riders derive profit from it.
2s9
As the return from a costly activity such as information gather-
ing is diverted, investment in that activity will decrease in the fu-
ture.m As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel explain:
Trading on information can be a form of theft. Firms regularly forbid
lawyers, accountants, printers, and others to trade on news about the
firm. Those who trade notwithstanding promises to abstain are stealing
assets of the firm as surely as if they reach into the till for cash exceeding
their salaries. Appropriation of information from another reduces the
incentive to create information and thus indirectly the efficiency of capi-
tal markets; and it is harmful (and should be forbidden) for the same
reasons that theft is harmful.
291
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1984).
' Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading Secret Agents, Evidentiay Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 SuP. Cr. REv. 309, 309-39.
' See Zvi BODIE ETAL., INvESTmENTs 345-47 (1989).
"7 Id. at 345.
2" Easterbrook, supra note 285, at 313.
"'United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 576-77 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
' Id. at 577 (WinterJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2' FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL P- FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 259-60 (1991).
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Therefore, if the law fails to preserve property rights in informa-
tion, fewer resources will be invested in producing such infor-
mation and market efficiency will suffer.
292
For example, it is costly for a hostile acquiror to take over
another corporation. Not only must the bidding firm incur ac-
counting, investment banking and legal fees, but it also must
purchase the target's stock. To control acquisition costs, acqui-
rors generally try to keep their planned activities private.29 If
word does get out, the market price of the target's stock not
only will increase, but the target might adopt costly defensive ac-
tions, such as poison pills294 or golden parachutes29 5 to prevent
the takeover. Consequently, the takeover loses its profitability
and the acquiror will invest less in such activities in the future. 7
Persons trading securities based upon misappropriated in-
formation further increase this risk of untimely disclosure.2 98 In
the instant case, O'Hagan bought Pillsbury securities based
upon his knowledge of Grand Met's planned tender offer.2 Al-
though O'Hagan's conduct did not affect the market price of
secuntes,3 others such as O'Hagan's broker, whoPillsbury uiis te  ha 'oonsbrkr 
learned of his trading success, can make the same trades?1  The
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 577 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Market efficiency refers to how accurately the market price of a security reflects the
"true" or intrinsic value of such security. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 286, at 34243.
The less information known about a security, the larger the divergence between the
market price and intrinsic value of such security. Id. This, in turn, reduces market
efficiency. Id. at 342-71. See also CARY& EISENBERG, supra note 42, at 211.
'3 See Petitioner's Brief at 3-4, O'Hagan (No. 96-842).
" A poison pill is a defensive tactic employed by a target company that makes its
common stock less attractive and/or more expensive to an acquiror. BLACK'S LAW
DIcrONARY, supra note 104, at 1156.
2" A golden parachute is an agreement that provides for substantial bonuses and
other benefits for top management and directors who are forced to resign from the
target company after the acquiror has taken control. Id. at 692.
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 577 (WinterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
297 Easterbrook, supra note 285, at 313. See Patrick Diaz & Rosemary Maxwell, In-
sider Trading and the Corporate Acquirer: Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5 Against Agents
Who Trade on Misappropriated Information, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 600, 610-15 (1988).
m' Chestman, 947 F.2d at 577 (Winter,J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 744 (2d Cir. 1992)
(acquiring corporation alleging that its profit from the acquisition of the target com-
pany was depressed due to the defendant's trading in the target's stock based upon
misappropriated information).
29 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1997).
Petitioner's Brief at 3-4, O'Hagan (No. 96-842).
See Easterbrook, supra note 285, at 336.
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broker, moreover, may recommend the stock to clients or
friends and relatives.s When trading activity in the stock
reaches a certain level, unrelated third parties may guess that
the reason for the trading is a corporate secret.03 By this stage,
Grand Met's information is worthless.0 4 The misappropriation
theory, therefore, prohibits insider trading that increases the
risk that information created at a cost is rendered worthless to
the principal.305
While information production and market efficiency would
suffer if property rights in information received no protection,
they would also be damaged if all trading based on material
nonpublic information were prohibited.m Efficient capital
markets require that persons who gather information at a cost,
such as hostile acquirors and technical analysts, be able to profit
from the information they produce.0 7 An equal-access-to-
information rule... would "create a securities market governed
by relative degrees of ignorance because the profit motive for
independently generating information about companies would
be substantially diminished." so9 Liability rules that critically chill
the vigorous production and dissemination of information,
therefore, should be avoided.3 '0
The misappropriation theory does not stifle legitimate in-
formation production because it only outlaws uses of confiden-
tial information that are irrelevant to its production. 1 While
the potential for profit is required before hostile acquirors and
technical analysts create information at their own expense, the
same cannot be said for the misappropriator.3 s2 By definition,
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 577 (Winter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id at 578 (WinterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (WinterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5
"Id. (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (WinterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
mId. (Winter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'08 See Texas Gulf Sulphur v. SEC, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (anyone in pos-
session of material nonpublic information must disclose such information or abstain
from trading).
9 Chestman, 947 F.2d at 578 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
It seems that this concern for market efficiency underscored the Court's rejection of
the parity-of-information rule in Chiarella and Dirks. See idi (Winter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
0 Olson et al., supra note 20, at 225.




the misappropriator personally profits on information given to
him "in the course of fulfilling other purposes, such as render-
ing services or selling goods to the source of the information. 1 3
Indeed, the fundamental characteristic of the misappropriation
theory is that the misappropriator obtains the confidential in-
formation for a purpose other than personal profit and then
uses the information for his own personal benefit in a securities
transaction. s4
In the instant case, for example, the information regarding
the potential takeover of Pillsbury had two distinct values: one
in securities trading and the other in legal service fees. Accord-
ing to the original plans, Grand Met was to derive value from
the purchase of Pillsbury stock and O'Hagan's performance of
legal services. That was the only reason Grand Met informed
O'Hagan of its intentions to acquire Pillsbury common stock.
316
The information was given to O'Hagan so he could represent
Grand Met as local counsel in its takeover attempt, not so he
could trade on the stock and option markets. 17 Based on this
compensation structure, the takeover information would have
been produced regardless of whether O'Hagan could personally
profit from a securities transaction. Therefore, the misappro-
priation theory does not stifle legitimate information produc-
tion and profits by Grand Met. Rather, it restricts only
extraneous profit-making by persons like O'Hagan.
Finally, the misappropriation theory elevates investor confi-
dence in the financial markets by prohibiting "a game in which
[the misappropriator] has loaded dice." 1 s As the task force on
insider trading reported:
[w] e traditionally abhor those who refuse to play by the rules, that is, the
cheaters and the sneaks. A spitball pitcher, or a card shark with an ace
up his sleeve, may win the game but not our respect. And if we know
such a person is in the game, chances are we won't play.3
9
313 id.
31 Id. at 356 n.111.
"' See Petitioner's Brief at 3-5, O'Hagan (No. 96-842). The legal services likely
would include ensuring that Grand Met complied with federal securities law regard-
ing takeovers, such as the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d), (e) (1996).
316 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1997).
317 m
"8 Finigan, supra note 17, at 723.
319 Olson et al., supra note 20, at 227.
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These sensible observations indicate that the misappropriation
theory satisfies two of the traditional reasons for condemning
insider trading: the "fair play" and "integrity of the market" ar-
guments.320 The former rests on the belief that cheaters like
O'Hagan are wrong and the "traditional sympathy [we have] for
the victim of the cheat" like Grand Met. 2' The latter relies on
the common-sense argument that people will hesitate to entrust
their money to a market they do not believe is fair.32 A rational
market participant who knows that the use of misappropriated
confidential information is not sanctioned by law will demand a
risk premium for dealing in the market.32 If the market is seen
to be saturated with misappropriators, some investors will ab-
stain entirely from dealing in such markets.2 4 Still others will
incur costs either to avoid dealing with such misappropriators
or to overcome illegally their informational disadvantage.32 As a
result, capital formation through the securities market will be-
come more difficult and expensive.328 Thus, by proscribing trad-
ing on misappropriated information, the misappropriation
theory reassures investors that the financial markets are honest
and fair32 7 and prevents inefficient search costs.
328
If the policy considerations are unclear, consider the follow-
ing not-so-unrealistic hypotheticals. Under scenario one, a law-
yer (L) is retained as counsel by Big Corporation to represent it
in its takeover of Small Corporation. Upon learning the news of
the impending takeover, L buys stock in Big Corporation in an-
ticipation of a stock price increase once the takeover is publicly
announced.32 Under scenario two, the same facts apply except




23Brudney, supra note 20, at 356.
324 as
325 id.
" Olson et al., supra note 20, at 228.
"2 Finigan, supra note 17, at 723.
328 See Brudney, supra note 20, at 356.
32 See Michael C. Jenson & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 16 (1983) (acquirers in successful takeover at-
tempts realize an average return of 3.8%).
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stock price increase once the takeover is made public.3 0 From a
policy perspective, it is difficult, if not impossible, to differenti-
ate scenario one, the classic insider trading theory, from sce-
nario two, the misappropriation theory, since both trades are
based on identical inside information that L learned through
his employment at Big Corporation. In holding the misappro-
priation theory a valid basis upon which to impose § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 liability, the Supreme Court refused to credit form
over substance and greatly furthered the efficiency and integrity
of the securities markets.
C. A NEW VERSION OF THE "IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT
While the majority correctly found the deception to be "in
connection with" a securities transaction,331 the majority's rea-
soning was flawed. According to Justice Ginsberg, this require-
ment is satisfied because "the fiduciary's fraud is consummated,
not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but
when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the informa-
tion to [trade] securities.3 32 Thus, she reasoned the securities
transaction and the breach of duty occur simultaneously.33
Justice Ginsberg erred in framing the issue in this manner, a
mistake noticed by the dissent.334 As Justice Thomas noted, the
majority's approach is erroneous because it ignores the fact that
the supposed threat to market integrity and investor confidence
"comes not from the supposed fraud [on the source], but from
the mere fact that the information was nonpublic."3 5 Even if
the source expressly authorizes its agents to trade on the confi-
dential information, the adverse impact on the markets is the
same since the misappropriator has an insurmountable infor-
mational advantage over the average investor.36
Justice Thomas's argument is valid only if one takes an
overly narrow view of what constitutes "in connection with" a se-
33See id. at 10 (targets in successful takeover attempts realize an average return of
29.1%). These are essentially the facts of O'Hagan. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117
S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1997).
".'O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209.321d.
""d. To bolster her conclusion, Justice Ginsberg noted that the confidential in-
formation had value to O'Hagan "ordinarily" in securities transactions. Id. at 2210.
3" See id. at 2225 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
.. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' Id (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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curities transaction. If one believes, as Justice Ginsberg did, that
a securities transaction includes only the actual purchase or sale
of securities, then the fraud is irrelevant to the subsequent
market integrity and the "in connection with" requirement is
not satisfied. The proper view, however, is to consider the gath-
ering of information itself as part of the gatheror's securities
transaction. First, as explained above, information gathering
has significant costs. 33 A person will not incur these costs if un-
able to profit from the information produced,8 9 which profit
ordinarily comes from trading in the securities markets.30 Thus,
the gathering of information should be considered part of the
gatheror's securities transaction since the search costs are in-
curred in anticipation of profiting in the purchase or sale of se-
curities.
In addition, information is unique in the financial markets;
it is the only asset that can alter the value of the underlying
commodity."' For example, the market price of Pillsbury com-
mon stock would skyrocket as soon as the information of Grand
Met's tender offer became public. When O'Hagan learned of
this information, his personal valuation of Pillsbury common
stock and call options exceeded the market's valuations, and,
thus, he bought substantial amounts of both of these securities
in anticipation of price increases once the information became
publicY43 Misappropriated money, unlike information, does not
alter the underlying commodity in any sense. It simply gives
the misappropriator the option to trade in the underlying
commodity if he so chooses. It does not change his personal
valuation of the commodity compared to the market's.
Under the view that the gathering of information is part of
the gatherer's securities transaction, O'Hagan's fraud was "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of securities. O'Hagan
defrauded the source of the information in anticipation of earn-
"7 Id. at 2209.
"s See Easterbrook, supra note 285, at 313.
39 Id.
-"0 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210.
-' See BODIE ET AL, supra note 286, at 342-43.
"2 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205. The price of Pillsbury increased more than 50%
from $39 to $60 per share of common stock. Id
'4'See Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, O71agan (No. 96-842).
'"See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2222-24 (Thomas,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (comparing misappropriated information to misappropriated money).
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ing profits in the securities markets.345 He knew that this infor-
mation, once made public, would alter the value of the underly-
346ing securities. If the gathering of information is deemed part
of the gatheror's securities transaction, O'Hagan's deceptive
device to acquire the information was "in connection with" a
purchase or sale of securities in violation of § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5.
VI. CONCLUSION
In United States v. O'Hagan, the Supreme Court concluded
that the misappropriation theory is a valid basis upon which to
base § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 liability. O'Hagan was correctly de-
cided, but should have employed different reasoning. First, the
misappropriation theory as adopted in O'Hagan is consistent
with the holdings in Chiarella and Dirks. Second, the misappro-
priation theory advances the efficiency and integrity of the secu-
rities market. Third, O'Hagan's deception was "in connection
with" a securities transaction not because the fraud and pur-
chase of securities happen together, as the Court believed, but
because the gathering of information by O'Hagan was part of
his securities transaction. The majority's approach ignores the
fact that the potential threat to market integrity and investor
confidence is due to the nonpublic nature of the information,
not the fraud on the source.
KEIrrH ADAM SIMON
"' Id at 2209-10.
... See id. at 2205. For other examples of profits from having inside information re-
garding tender offers, see Chiarelia v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980) ($30,000
profits over 14 month period), SEC v. Cherif 933 F.2d 403, 407 (7th Cir. 1991)
($247,000 profits during 10 month period), SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir.
1990) ($57,000 profits over two month period), and SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200
(2d Cir 1984) (nearly $100,000 profits during two year period).
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